What Effort Level Should I Choose?
On the Economics of Reasoning Effort in LLM Agents
Kaiser Sun1*, Yongchan Kwon2, Zain Hasan2, Shang Zhu2, Kaitlyn Zhou3,2, Federico Bianchi2
1Johns Hopkins University • 2Together AI • 3Cornell University
Executive Summary / TL;DR
Frontier LLMs provide dials for "reasoning effort", charging premium rates under the assumption that more test-time compute monotonically helps. In reality, reasoning effort is an economic credence good: higher effort frequently fails on tasks that lower effort easily solved, can inflate costs on identical tasks by up to 42× (driven by both more computation per call and longer trajectories that reprocess growing context), and provokes counterproductive self-verification loops. A straightforward dynamic policy—starting low and escalating only after verified failure—matches or improves success over fixed top effort across evaluated models and benchmarks, usually at lower cost. On Terminal-Bench, four of eight models instead gain success at increased API cost.
Why This Matters: Reasoning as a Credence Good
In economics, a credence good is an expertise service whose utility is difficult or impossible for the consumer to evaluate even after purchase—classic examples being automotive engine repairs, medical treatments, or complex legal advice. You pay an auto mechanic $1,200 for a replaced head gasket; the car drives afterwards, but did you truly need that specific repair, or would a $50 spark plug have solved the stall?
Reasoning effort dials (such as low, medium, high, xhigh in OpenAI's GPT-5.6 family or Anthropic's Claude Sonnet 5 adaptive thinking) are marketed as linear compute upgrades. However, users must choose this dial upfront, before the agent executes. If the task succeeds at high, the user has no way of knowing whether the run was successful because of the extra reasoning tokens or whether low would have succeeded for a fraction of the cost.
In multi-turn agentic workflows (e.g. SWE-Bench, Terminal-Bench), this upfront choice is amplified across dozens of sequential tool invocations. The fixed dial setting is multiplied on every step, repeatedly rereading an expanding context window and generating thousands of hidden tokens.
The Big Idea in One Paragraph
By conducting the first systematic, task-level counterfactual audit across 8 frontier models (proprietary GPT-5.6-sol/terra/luna, Claude Sonnet 5, and open-weight GLM-5.2, Inkling, Kimi K3, DeepSeek-V4 Flash) on both single-turn math/science (AIME 2026, GPQA Diamond) and multi-turn agentic benchmarks (Terminal-Bench 2.1, SWE-Bench Pro), the authors demonstrate that reasoning effort acts as a blunt, fixed compute multiplier rather than a problem-calibrated upper bound. Higher effort does not nest lower-effort successes, routinely overthinks simple tasks, drives shortcut behaviors (like reading gold git commits), and inflates latency. Because self-routing before execution fails, one promising but verifier-dependent strategy is naïve laddering: start at minimum effort and escalate only upon verified failure.
Aggregate Gains Conceal Lower-Effort Regressions
Standard benchmark reporting presents average accuracy scores, fostering the natural belief that solved sets are strictly nested:
In reality, this assumption fails routinely. When effort increases, models gain some previously unsolved instances, but simultaneously enter failure states on tasks that lower effort solved. The regression set $s_{e_1} \setminus s_{e_2}$ is non-empty for every single model evaluated on Terminal-Bench 2.1.
Verified reversal example
GPT-5.6-sol on Terminal-Bench 2.1: high → xhigh loses 8 solved tasks and gains 5, reducing solved count from 76 to 73 of 89 (85.4% → 82.0%). Source: Section 3.1 and Table 4. Other per-model transition counts are omitted rather than inferred from chart bars.
Overspending on Easy Tasks & The "None" Trap
Does setting high effort allow the agent to quickly solve an easy task and terminate? No. On the intersection of tasks that are successfully solved across all effort levels ($s_{all}$), mean execution costs explode—up to 42× for Inkling, 4.54× for GPT-5.6-sol on SWE-Bench Pro, and 5.34× for GPT-5.6-luna.
Critically, this cost explosion is not caused by reasoning tokens alone. In agents, input-token charges can rise substantially as context grows (Figure 2; no universal percentage split is established here). When given high effort, models produce longer agentic trajectories with more tool invocations, each re-reading the entire accumulated conversation history.
none vs just 5.4 calls at low, costing 4.58× as much at none! Without reasoning scratchpads, models flounder, making aimless tool calls whose growing transcripts inflate input billing.
Verified always-solved cost comparisons
- Terminal-Bench: GPT-5.6-sol 2.51×; Claude Sonnet 5 3.04×.
- SWE-Bench Pro: GPT-5.6-sol 4.54× (USD 0.27 → USD 1.24); GPT-5.6-luna 5.34×.
- Figure 2 labels Inkling's highest-effort SWE-Bench Pro bar 42×.
Source: Section 3.2 and Figure 2. Comparisons use each model/benchmark's always-solved subset and lowest reasoning-enabled baseline. Unsupported per-model percentages and approximate bar readings have been omitted.
Different Efforts Produce Different Behavioral Strategies
Effort levels do not merely deliberate longer; they actively alter the problem-solving strategy. Using the Act·ONOMY agent behavior taxonomy across hundreds of annotated rollouts, the researchers discovered two major behavioral pathologies:
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Git History Archaeology (Benchmark Leakage): On SWE-Bench Pro, repository history accidentally contained the gold reference fix commits. At
loweffort, GPT-5.6-sol examined git commits in only 15.9% of tasks. Atxhigh, it aggressively ran git archaeology and read the reference-fix commit in 75.0% of tasks. When the authors created SWE-Bench Pro-Corrected (stripping git history and firewalling un-whitelisted internet access), maximum-effort solve rates fell across all 8 models (11.4–29.5 percentage points; statistically significant for 5 of 8) (e.g. GPT-5.6-sol fell from 77.3% to 59.1%, Claude Sonnet 5 from 79.5% to 50.0%). -
Pathological Self-Verification: At higher effort, agents double and triple check their work (running test suites, diffs, linters). However, self-verification frequently checked conditions that diverged from external evaluators. In Terminal-Bench's
dna-insert, the agent's high-effort run hallucinated that its output satisfied a constraint and halted, whereas its low-effort run completed cleanly. Insanitize-git-repo, GLM-5.2's max-effort run spent extra verification steps rewriting git history, inadvertently deleting a commit required by the external verifier!
Case Study: GPT-5.6-sol Trajectory on openlibrary-00bec1e7
Comparing identical problem execution under none vs xhigh
At xhigh, the agent spent $1.00 (vs $0.19) and took 27 turns to do what it already accomplished in turn 14, purely to excavate git history and verify byte-for-byte equality with the original author's commit.
Why Self-Routing Fails, but Naïve Laddering Succeeds
Can models simply be prompted upfront to inspect the task prompt and declare: "This is simple, run at low" or "This is brutal, run at high"? The authors tested this Self-Routing policy across thousands of prompts. The outcome: self-routing yields no consistent advantage over naive random allocation. Upfront prompt inspection cannot forecast execution difficulty.
However, an astonishingly simple heuristic—Naïve Laddering—dramatically outperforms fixed settings:
The Naïve Laddering Protocol
1. Always initiate the task at the lowest available reasoning effort ($e_{\min}$).
2. Evaluate the output using the environment's external correctness check (test suite, verifier script, compiler).
3. If and only if the verifier fails, execute a fresh retry at the highest effort setting ($e_{\max}$). Both attempts are billed.
Because laddering guarantees preservation of every task the low-effort model solves, its success set is the union $s_{\text{low}} \cup s_{\text{high}}$. As demonstrated in Figure 5 and Appendix H, naïve laddering matches or improves accuracy across all evaluated models and benchmarks while slashing median API bills by 25.3% on AIME, 41.5% on GPQA, and 15.5% on corrected SWE-Bench Pro!
Verified laddering comparisons
Section 3.4 reports these Terminal-Bench comparisons against fixed top effort:
- GPT-5.6-sol: 83.0% → 88.6% success (+5.6 percentage points); 17.4% lower API cost.
- Claude Sonnet 5: 76.1% → 83.0% (+6.9 points); 8.7% lower API cost.
- Kimi K3: 73.0% → 84.3% (+11.3 points); 30.5% lower API cost.
These policy-cohort values must not be mixed with Table 4 full-set accuracies. Figure 5 normalizes cost against the fixed effort with the highest performance, which is not necessarily the highest effort. Four of eight models improve success at increased API cost. Both executions are charged when escalation occurs.
Counting User Waiting Time: Why Latency Dominates
Looking solely at provider API token bills fundamentally misranks model configurations because it ignores developer opportunity cost. The authors formulate the total economic cost $C_{\text{full}}$:
When factoring in human idle latency, waiting costs represent 58% to 98% of the true cost of running agentic workflows. Because naïve laddering solves the vast majority of tasks quickly at $e_{\min}$ without spawning massive reasoning chains, its full-cost advantage over fixed top effort is even greater (e.g. GPT-5.6-terra saves 19.5% in full cost vs only 4.8% in API charges alone).
Illustrative $C_{\text{full}}$ Cost & Opportunity Wage Calculator
Illustration of Equation 1, not a reproduction of measured totals: assumes 2,100 low-effort and 16,200 xhigh generated tokens, with adjustable throughput and wage. API costs USD 0.27 and USD 1.24 are reported values; token counts are illustrative approximations.
Limitations & Open Questions
- Single Agentic Rollout Constraint: Due to immense compute costs ($14,071.10 API spend in total), the primary Terminal-Bench and SWE-Bench Pro evaluations ran single rollouts per task-effort pair. While the authors verified that reversals persist under repeated 4-rollout executions on DeepSWE v1.1 (Appendix J), individual task regressions retain an element of stochastic sampling noise.
- Laddering Relies on an Oracle Verifier: Naïve laddering requires an external unit test or compiler feedback to decide whether to escalate. In open-ended customer support, literature synthesis, or exploratory coding where no test suite exists, laddering cannot easily trigger without autonomous self-evaluation (which currently suffers from severe hallucination).
- Proprietary Opacity: Frontier providers treat reasoning effort implementations as proprietary trade secrets. While open-weight models disclose continuous RL length-penalties or hard interruption thresholds, OpenAI and Anthropic do not disclose whether their settings alter temperature, system prompts, or internal test-time search policies.
- Multi-Tasking Opportunity Costs: The full-cost equation assumes users sit synchronously blocked during agent execution. In real workplaces, engineers switch contexts to other work (though research by Mark et al. and Leroy confirms substantial attention residue and cognitive restart penalties).
Glossary of Key Terms
An economic good whose utility or necessity cannot be verified by the buyer even post-consumption, creating asymmetric information and potential supplier overcharging.
The set of benchmark tasks successfully solved at lower effort $e_1$ that fail when re-attempted at higher effort $e_2$.
The strict mathematical intersection of tasks successfully solved across all evaluated effort tiers, used to isolate pure cost inflation without performance confounds.
A dynamic execution policy that executes tasks at the cheapest reasoning setting first, escalating to top effort only if an external test fails.
A 3-level grounded-theory hierarchical taxonomy (10 top actions, 46 subactions, 120 categories) used to systematically tag agent trajectory behaviors.
Prompting an LLM prior to execution to read the problem statement and predict the minimum reasoning effort tier needed to solve it.
Citation
@article{sun2026effort,
title={What Effort Level Should I Choose? On the Economics of Reasoning Effort in LLM Agents},
author={Sun, Kaiser and Kwon, Yongchan and Hasan, Zain and Zhu, Shang and Zhou, Kaitlyn and Bianchi, Federico},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2610.34491},
year={2026}
}